Distributed and Secure ML using Self-tallying Multi-party Aggregation

Yunhui Long*, Tanmay Gangwani*, Haris Mughees and Carl Gunter (* equal contribution)

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Motivating Example -- Cumulative Voting



Goals:

- Calculate Homomorphic Vector Addition
- □ Protect privacy
- Generate and Validate Proofs for Input Validity



Challenges

- □ No trusted third party
- □ No private channel
- Participating Parties can be malicious

Our Approaches

Blockchain

- Additive Homomorphic Encryptions [Hao et al.]
- ZKP for input validity
 L1 norm range proof
 L2 norm range proof

[Hao et al.] Hao, Feng, Peter YA Ryan, and Piotr Zielinski. "Anonymous voting by two-round public discussion." IET Information Security 4.2 (2010): 62-67.

Multi-party Vector Addition Protocol (Round 1)



Multi-party Vector Addition Protocol (Round 2)



Self-tallying

Self-tallying:

Verify ZKPs offline

Compute the results offline

No trusted talliers





Beyond Cumulative Voting

- Machine Learning models
- Train on ALL data -> better accuracy
- Preserve confidential info.
- Get predictions (locally)



Naive Bayes
$$\left(\begin{array}{c} & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & &$$

Beyond Cumulative Voting

- Machine Learning models
- Train on ALL data -> better accuracy
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- Linear Regression
- Naive Bayes
- Decision Trees
- Matrix Ops. (SVD etc.)
- More...



One ZKP too many!

ZKP L2 norm
 Negative values ok
 Composed of 4 ZKPs

[-3 4 -5 7] + [-2 4 5 -9]

ZKP L1 norm
 Only positive values
 Composed of many ZKPs

[3 4 5 7] + [2 4 5 9]

Optimizing range proofs
 Use base > 2
 Gotta Batch'em All

Implementation



 ECC ElGamal
 Off-chain crypto

 Generation and Verification

 Block-chain as white board

 Proofs submission
 Other public information

ZKP Time Overheads





ZKP Generation Time per User

ZKP Verification time per User (n=1)

Time Analysis



Time to Compute Discrete-log



Verification Time per User with Increasing Total Users

Future Work

- Denial of Service Attacks
 - User fails to reveal the right ciphertext in the second round
 - Countermeasure 1: Identify the adversary, remove it from the protocol, and start a new round
 - Countermeasure 2: Punish the adversary by taking its collateral
 - More efficient countermeasures?
- Solve an open problem!
 - Discussion Forum Problem in cryptocurrency governance?
 - Multi-party Machine Learning?
 - Solved: Decision Tree, Naive Bayes, Matrix Factorization, Linear Regression
 - Challenges: SVM, Neural Network, LDA
- Evaluation of Alternative Methods (SGX, Generic Snarks)
- Combination with extra properties (e.g. Coercion resistance)
- Economic Feasibility

Thank You!